• Increased supervision/ monitoring of physical access to electronic voting machines, especially as it pertains to any interfaces or ports except for the Voter Activation Card slot (typically found on the front)
• Frequent verification of hardware or software errors, such as those displayed on operator screens (e.g.: the LCD on the back of a Sequoia voting machine)
• Monitoring and verification of tamper-proof and/or tamper-evident seals (typically used to prevent or at least indicate tampering) surrounding the devices, ports, latches, etc.
In the long term, phasing out and replacing deprecated, insecure machines - namely those without robust, hardware-based firmware and data verification mechanisms is recommended. Also, additional due diligence of polling place volunteers, workers, and officers may help mitigate possible collusion for tampering by these groups.
Reporting
Cylance has provided details of the vulnerabilities to both the manufacturer Sequoia and government authorities, as well as provided suggestions for mitigation.
The decision to announce the research findings was intended to encourage remediation of the vulnerabilities prior to Election Day.